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Abstract 
In April 2008 the International Monetary Fund approved a resolution which modified 
its quotas and voting power . The goal was to realign, at least in part, the voting power of 
IMF member countries with their relative weight and role in the world economy, while 
ensuring better representation for the poorest ones. This paper guides the reader through the 
complicated process that led to the final outcome, exploring both the technical aspects of the 
reform and the underlying political motivations. In particular, we discuss the functions of 
IMF quotas and their evolution in an historical perspective. We talk about the inadequacy of 
the former distribution of voting power and, therefore, the need for the reform. We also 
analyze several technical aspects debated during the negotiations. Finally, we assess the 
effectiveness of the resolution in achieving the proposed goals. We conclude that the 
approved outcome represents a first step in the right direction. Nevertheless, some issues 
remain unresolved and will need to be addressed in the future. 
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LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AQS   Actual quota share   
BV  Basic votes 
BW   Bretton Woods 
CQS   Calculated quota share 
FQS   Final quota share, after IMF quota increase 
GDP   Gross domestic product calculated at market exchange rates 
PPP GDP   Gross domestic product at purchasing power parity 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMFC   International Monetary and Financial Committee 
OPEN   Openness 
PRGF   Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
QS  Quota share 
RES   Reserves 
SDR   Special Drawing Rights 
VAR   Variability 
VP  Voting power  
VS  Voting share  
 
a a a a   Share of gap (see below) filled after the overall quota increase 
q q q q  Under representation threshold. It is assumed to be non 
negative (see under represented country) 
i   Country index 
f   See compression factor 
F   See rescaling factor 
R   Percentage increase of total quotas  
wj   Weight of variable j 
 
Actual quota share    Quota share prevailing before the ad hoc quota increase decided 
in Singapore, if not otherwise specified. 
Allocation mechanisms   Rules governing the allocation of the quota increase among 
eligible countries.  
Blended GDP   Weighted average of GDP measured at market exchange rates 
and at purchasing power parities (PPP GDP).  
Calculated quota share  The quota share of a member that can be computed on the 
basis of the quota formulas system.  
Compression   Two step procedure: first, for each member, the weighted sum 




i i X w X w X w + + + ... 2 2 1 1 )  is  raised  to  the  power  of  f; 
second, results are rescaled by F to sum up to 100. 
Compression factor  The exponent f in the formula. 
Eligible countries   IMF members that are entitled to a quota increase. 
First round increase  A limited ad hoc increase in quotas for China, Korea, Mexico 
and Turkey, deliberated in September 2006 at Singapore.  
Foregoing   Amount of a quota increase that an eligible country is willing 
not to subscribe. 
Gap  Difference  between  CQS  and  AQS.  Computed  only  for 
under represented countries. 
Gap closure   The share of the gap filled after the adjustment.   6 
Rescaling factor  The coefficient F in the formula needed to make compressed 
quotas summing up to 100. 
Under represented country   A country with CQS/AQS > 1 + q. 
Voting power  Number  of  votes  assigned  to  each  member.  Currently 
members  receive  one  vote  for  each  SDR  100,000  plus  250 
basic votes. 
Voting share  Percentage of a country’s votes relative to the IMF members 
total voting power. 
COUNTRY GROUPS 
Advanced (25)   Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  
Japan,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  San  Marino,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United 
Kingdom, United States. 
Dynamic (12)  This group was defined in the Canadian proposal put forward 
at the 2007 G20 meeting held in Istanbul. In broad terms, it 
refers to those emerging countries that contributed by more 
than  0.5  percent  to  global  economic  growth  in  PPP  GDP 
terms in the 5 year period ending in 2004. The group includes 
the  following  12  countries:  Brazil,  China,  Korea,  India, 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Philippines  Poland,  Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam.  
Group of Seven   G7  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Japan,  Italy,  United  Kingdom, 
United States. 
Non advanced (160)  All  IMF  members  except  advanced  countries.  Korea  and 
Singapore are included in this group, as well as Cyprus, Malta 
and Slovenia, consistently with IMF documents at the time of 
writing. 
PRGF (78)  Low income countries qualified to receive financial assistance 
under  the  IMF’s  Poverty  Reduction  and  Growth  Facility 
(PRGF): Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso,  Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad,  Comoros,  Côte  d'Ivoire,  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo,  Djibouti,  Dominica,  Eritrea,  Ethiopia,  Georgia, 
Ghana,  Grenada,  Guinea,  Guinea Bissau,  Guyana,  Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, 
Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Maldives,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Moldova,  Mongolia,  Mozambique,  Myanmar,  Nepal, 
Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Nepal,  Pakistan,  Papua  New 
Guinea,  Popular  Democratic  Republic  of  Lao,  Republic  of 
Congo, Republic of Yemen, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  Sudan, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, The Gambia, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, 
Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.   7 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in the global economy have cast doubt on the adequacy of the Fund’s 
governance.  Some  emerging  market  countries  have  now  become  global  players  and  have 
expressly requested to increase their political weight at the IMF. On the other hand, while low 
income countries have progressively lost ground, advanced countries as a group continue to 
provide the bulk of the Fund’s resources and therefore have the greatest say at the IMF. To 
maintain  the  relevance  of  the  Fund  as  the  primary  forum  for  international  cooperation  on 
monetary and financial issues, an adjustment in the distribution of its members’ political weights 
appears warranted at this juncture. 
The political weight of a country at the IMF is measured by its voting share, i.e., the number of its 
votes relative to the number of votes of all the Fund’s members. Since countries’ relative votes 
depend heavily on their quotas in the IMF’s capital
1, it is natural to think that the necessary 
reallocation  of  powers  within  that  institution  should  entail  a  change  in  the  Fund’s  quotas. 
Unfortunately this is easier said than done, for three main reasons. First, quota negotiations 
typically hinge on technical benchmarks (meant to gauge countries’ relative position in the world 
economy), which over the years have become increasingly complex and opaque. Second, there 
are a number of constraints embedded in the Fund’s statutes (the Articles of Agreement) that 
prevent a full adjustment of actual quotas to the benchmark. Third, changes in countries’ quotas 
remain a prominently political issue, and the amount of political consensus required by these 
changes has always represented an essential condition for their approval. Over the years this 
political dimension translated into additional complexity for the technical engineering of any 
quota reform proposal. 
The former IMF’s Managing Director, Rodrigo de Rato, launched in 2005 an ambitious reform 
agenda  (the  Medium  Term  Strategy,  MTS),  which  solicited  a  change  in  several  key  areas, 
including governance. At the 2006 Annual Meetings in Singapore, a resolution was approved by 
the Board of Governors to allocate a quota downpayment to the four most under represented 
countries (China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey). This resulted in a moderate increase in the voting 
shares of these countries. The Singapore Resolution called for, among other things, an update 
and simplification of the quota benchmark, as well as for a second ad hoc quota increase based on 
the new benchmark. Finally the Singapore Resolution urged that these reforms be completed 
before the 2008 Annual Meetings (see Chapter 1 for more details).  
In late March 2008, the Board of Executive Directors approved a new draft resolution (the 2008 
Resolution), which was eventually approved by the Board of Governors on April, 28.  
This paper sets out to guide the reader through the process that led to the April 2008 Resolution 
(the 2008 Resolution), with particular reference to the technical aspects of the reform and the 
many  political  issues  involved.  It  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  first  chapter,  the  actual 
distribution  of  IMF  quotas  is  surveyed  in  a  historical  perspective,  the  shortcomings  of  the 
                                                 
1 The votes of each country are the sum of two components: the so called basic votes and an amount of votes 
proportional  to  the  member’s  quota.  Basic  votes  are  automatically  granted  at  subscription  and  their  number 
(currently 250) is the same for all members. Countries are also entitled to express one additional vote every 100,000 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of quota subscribed. Quotas are denominated in SDR, an international reserve asset 
created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves of member countries. The SDR also serves as 
the unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations. Its value is based on a basket of key 
international currencies (at present they are: US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling).   8 
resulting voting power are assessed, and the need for change arising from new global players and 
low income countries is noted. In the second chapter, the key elements involved in the reform 
package are analyzed. For simplicity’s sake they will be treated separately, although it should be 
borne in mind that the final outcome of the reform shall be determined by the simultaneous 
interaction  of  all  its  parameters.  Finally,  Chapter  3  describes  and  evaluates  the  March  2008 
Resolution, also in the light of the analytical framework developed in the previous chapters. 
1. CURRENT QUOTA SYSTEM AND REVIEWS 
When joining the IMF all member countries must subscribe a quota of its capital.  
Quotas play four different roles in the functioning of the institution. In particular, they: (a) set the 
amount of financial resources that a member is obliged to provide the IMF with
2; (b) determine 
the  amount  of  financing  that  a  member  can  expect  to  obtain  from  the  IMF  under  normal 
circumstances (“normal access limits”); (c) concur, together with the number of basic votes, to 
the calculation of members’ voting power within the institution; and (d) define the share received 
by each member in general SDR allocations.
 3 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreements (the Articles) neither specify how a member’s quota should be 
determined, nor clarify how quotas should be adjusted over time. They only stipulate that the 
IMF’s Board of Executive Directors should conduct a general review of quotas at intervals not 
longer than five years, and propose the appropriate adjustments to the Board of Governors for 
their final approval. However, quota negotiations have been traditionally linked to an assessment 
of countries’ relative positions in the world economy, based on factors such as national incomes 
and external trade and payments values (IMF, 2001). To this end, use has been made of a system 
of quota formulas, whose juridical status was never made clear in the Articles. This system has 
remained only as a theoretical benchmark and, over the years, the IMF’s actual quota shares have 
been adjusted to those calculated with the formulas only to a very limited extent. 
1.1. Quota formulas and reviews in the IMF’s Articles of Agreements 
The Articles stipulate a procedure for General Quota Reviews: quota adjustments are proposed 
by  the  Board  of  Governors,  with  a  periodicity  of  no  more  than  five  years,  based  on  an 
assessment of the current situation (Article III Section 2(a)). Finally, the possibility is left open 
for quota increases to individual members, the so called ad hoc quota increases, if requested. 
Since its foundation, the IMF has used special formulas to guide the negotiations on members’ 
quotas. The original formula was introduced at Bretton Woods (BW) in 1944. It considered the 
level of GDP at current market prices for a recent year, the level of foreign reserves, the level of 
current account transactions, and the variability of the latter. Four other formulas were added to 
the original one in 1963, to better capture changes in the world economy. These derive from the 
                                                 
2 The subscription must be paid in full upon joining the Fund: 25 percent must be paid in SDR or widely accepted 
currencies, the rest is paid in the member’s own currency. 
3 General allocations of SDR are periodical SDR distributions based on a long term global need to supplement 
existing reserve assets. General allocations are considered every five years, although decisions to allocate SDR have 
been made only twice. The first allocation was for a total amount of SDR 9.3 billion, distributed in 1970 72. The 
second allocation was distributed in 1979 81 and brought the cumulative total of SDR allocations to SDR 21.4 
billion.    9 
original formula, make use of the same variables but are weighted differently. The current system 
is based upon the BW formula plus the four additional ones (see the appendix for details).  
The Articles set two major constraints on quota adjustments (Article III Section 2 (c) and (d)). 
First, changes in IMF quotas must be approved by the Board of Governors with a qualified 
majority of 85 percent of all votes: this gives the United States a de facto veto power on all 
proposed quota reforms. Second, each member can veto changes in its own quota level. Changes 
in  IMF  quota  shares  have  normally  been  implemented  (a)  in  the  context  of  general  quota 
increases, through increases in the quotas of some members, larger than those received by the 
remaining ones; or (b) in the context of ad hoc quota increases, by raising the quotas of selected 
members only. The veto power of individual countries also explains why, under the prevailing 
rules of the game, the vector of actual quota shares cannot be brought fully in line with the 
calculated one.
4 
Since the IMF’s foundation, there have been 13 General Quota Reviews, 8 of which have been 
followed by quota increases. The last review was completed in January 2008 and no general quota 
increase was decided. In the last 30 years, there have been only 6 ad hoc increases out of the 
context of a General Quota Review. As noted earlier, the last one was granted in September 2006 
to China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey, for a total amount of SDR 3,847 (US $ 6,263) million, equal 
to 1.8 percent of the total Fund’s quotas.  
1.2 A historical perspective  
The  overwhelming  majority  of  these  quota  increases  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  an 
assessment of the adequacy of IMF total liquidity in matching members’ balance of payments 
financing  needs  (IMF,  2003).  Instead,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  changes  in  members’ 
relative positions in the world economy as described by the quota formulas. In particular, “the 
bulk of the quota increases resulting from the five yearly general quota reviews has taken the 
form of increases expressed as a uniform percentage of the then existing quotas” (IMF, 2000). In 
other words, total quota increases have been distributed equiproportionally to existing quota 
shares, thus leaving unchanged their distribution. On average, the share of increases in quotas has 
been about 75 percent, and has ranged from a minimum of 40 percent to a maximum of 98 
percent. In some of the past Quota Reviews (fifth, sixth and ninth), countries entitled to a certain 
increase in their own quota level decided to accept only a part of it, thus voluntarily reducing 
their own quota share. This notwithstanding, actual quota shares have adjusted only partially 
towards calculated ones. In fact, they have never been reduced and have been only modestly 
realigned to under represented countries. 
As a consequence, not only the current distribution of quota shares but also their total amount 
does not correspond to the calculated ones. Some figures can help to illustrate this gap. Since the 
IMF foundation, membership has more than quadrupled from the original 45 countries to the 
current 185 members. Actual quotas have increased even more, reaching the current SDR 217 
billion from the original SDR 8 billion. However, actual quotas are still a small share of calculated 
ones, which are presently worth about SDR 1,140 billion (Skala et al., 2007). 
                                                 
4 See the numerical example on pg. 17 for a more detailed explanation of the effects of such veto power.   10 
The need for an in depth revision of IMF quotas is basically due to the misalignment in the quota 
shares of some key country groups, which do not correspond to their relative importance in the 
world economy. This can be gauged through different measures. The most obvious benchmark is 
GDP measured at market exchange rates (MER GDP); a possible alternative could be GDP 
measured at Purchasing Power Parities (PPP GDP), which allows for a better comparison of 
economic welfare. 
In Figure 1, the IMF quota shares of three country groups (advanced, dynamic and PRGF) are 
compared with their shares in world MER GDP and PPP GDP.
5 Based on this comparison, 
advanced countries would appear to be under represented in terms of MER GDP and slightly 
over represented in terms of PPP GDP. On the other hand, PRGF countries would appear to be 
over represented in terms of MER GDP and under represented in terms of PPP GDP, while the 
third group would be under represented according to both measures. 
 
  Figure 1   
Figures 2a and 2b show how the ratios between IMF quota shares and countries’ shares in world 
MER GDP and PPP GDP have evolved in the last 20 years.
6  
                                                 
5 These are the data circulated by the IMF in 2007 and used in the updated quota calculations (averages 2003 2005). 
6 These ratios compare the importance of a group in terms of IMF quota shares to its relevance in terms of other 
economic measures; whenever it takes values above (below) one, the group is over represented (under represented) 
according to that measure.   11 
 
  Figure 2a   
For  advanced  countries,  the  ratio  between  IMF  quota  shares  and  MER GDP  shares  has 
remained below one for the entire period, while the ratio between IMF quota shares and PPP 
GDP shares started to grow above one since the early 1990s. The trend for dynamic emerging 
economies  is  clearer:  both  ratios  have  grown  over  time,  signalling  their  increasing  under 
representation. Finally, PRGF countries, which were traditionally over represented in terms of 
PPP GDP, have recently become under represented. On the other hand, their quota share is 
always larger then their weight in terms of GDP (figure 2a, right scale).  
 
  Figure 2b   
1.3. The Singapore Resolution and the subsequent debate 
At the 2006 Annual Meeting in Singapore, the Board of Governors approved a resolution on 
quotas and voice reform. The Resolution envisaged a two step approach that rests on four pillars.   12 
Pillar 1. A first round ad hoc increase in the quotas of the four most under represented countries 
(China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey).
7 This increase was meant as a down payment to the four 
beneficiaries and as a first step for a wider realignment of quotas.  
Pillar 2. A deep revision in the current system of quota formulas, which should “provide a 
simpler  and  more  transparent  means  of  capturing  a  member’s  relative position  in  the  world 
economy”,  giving  a  “significantly  higher  weight  to  GDP  together  with  ensuring  that  other 
variables, in particular openness, also play an important role” (IMFC, 2007).  
Pillar 3. A second round increase in quotas, based on the new formula.  
Pillar 4. At least a doubling of basic votes, to preserve the voting share of low income countries 
as a group.  
The reform should be seen as a unique comprehensive package and be delivered not later than 
the 2008 Spring Meetings. 
After the Singapore Resolution, consensus emerged on the use of a single formula to guarantee 
transparency and simplicity.
8 It was also agreed that formula variables should be an updated 
version  of  the  current  ones  (IMF  2007a),  and  that  gross  domestic  product  should  have  the 
highest weight and reserves the lowest.
9 In October 2007, consensus was reached on additional 
elements, namely: (a) a commitment to acknowledge the role of PPP GDP in determining the 
new IMF quotas, along with a compression factor (see Chapter 2); (b) an increase in total IMF 
quotas “of the order of 10 percent”; and (c) a further increase in the voting share of emerging 
market and developing economies as a whole (IMFC, 2007). This notwithstanding, divergences 
remained on several points which will be analyzed in the following chapter.  
2. MEANS FOR BUILDING THE NEW DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES 
Any changes in the distribution of IMF’s quota and voting shares must be based on a number of 
key elements, such as: (a) the economic variables used for ranking members’ relevance in the 
world  economy;  (b)  the  functional  form  of  the  quota  formula;  (c)  the  criteria  for  selecting 
countries entitled to quota increases (eligibility criteria); (d) the size of the overall quota increase; 
(e) how this increase is allocated to eligible countries; and, finally, (f) the number of basic votes 
assigned to each member. 
The final outcome clearly depends on the interaction between all such elements. Unfortunately, 
its outcome cannot be easily predicted ex ante. In particular, as a result of linear changes in any of 
the parameters, the simulated distribution of votes will typically vary in a nonlinear fashion. 
                                                 
7 These countries were under represented both on the basis of the existing quota formulas and on each of the 
various filters (based upon the variables used in the formulas) used to classify countries. Each of these countries 
reduced the gap between calculated and actual quota share of about 1/3.  
8 Paradoxically, this decision made it more difficult to reach an agreement, since a single formula was unlikely to 
accommodate the conflicting requests made by the parties involved in quota negotiations. To help build up the 
necessary  consensus,  temporary  additional  ad  hoc  elements  were  proposed  subsequently,  at  the  expense  of 
transparency (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
9 Reserves have been given a low weight due to the potential perverse incentives associated with excess reserve 
accumulation. Indeed,  recent  accumulations  in  the  context  of  deliberate  policies  have been  in connection  with 
insufficient flexibility of exchange rates.   13 
More importantly, any alternative reform scenarios need to be evaluated in terms of their political 
feasibility. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: first, the key elements involved 
in the reform will be assessed separately together with the political issues involved. Then, some 
of the interactions between the parameters will be scrutinized.  
2.1. The quota formula 
The first element is represented by the variables and formula used to compute the benchmark 
for  members’  quota  shares  (calculated  quota  shares).  This  benchmark  makes  it  possible  to 
identify under represented and over represented countries, i.e., those whose current quota shares 
are, respectively, lesser or greater than the calculated ones. 
The need for a “simpler and more transparent” system of quota formulas naturally leads to the 




i i i X w X w X w F q + + + ´ = ... 2 2 1 1  
where q
i is the quota share of the i th member (or calculated quota share, CQS), and the variables X 
are expressed as shares of IMF totals.  
Variables  
Quota negotiations have focused on the following five economic variables, many of which are 
defined in the same manner as those already in use. 
Gross Domestic Product at Market Exchange Rate (MER GDP). This is a new variable, which had not 
been  considered  in  the  earlier  system  of  quota  formulas.  It  is  an  average  over  three  years, 
evaluated at market exchange rates. It provides a comprehensive measure of the economic size of 
a  country  and  is  also  a  relevant  indicator  of  a  member’s  ability  to  contribute  to  the  Fund’s 
financial resources.  
Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parities (PPP GDP). This variable is an average over  three 
years, expressed in international dollars.
10 A rationale for its use is that PPP GDP may be relevant 
to the Fund’s non financial activities; moreover, it is regularly used in the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook to measure countries’ weight in the global economy.   
Openness (OPEN). It is defined as the average sum over a five year time span of current receipts 
and  payments  for  international  transactions  in  goods,  services,  income  and  transfers.  This 
variable  (which  does  not  include  financial  transactions)  can  be  viewed  as  an  indicator  of  a 
member’s involvement and stake in the global economy. In addition, as relatively more open 
countries may be more vulnerable to external shocks, it can also serve as an indicator of potential 
demand for Fund’s resources. 
Variability (VAR). This is measured by the variability of current account receipts (credits) plus 
net capital flows, defined as “one standard deviation from the centred 5 year moving average, 
from a recent 13 year period”. It provides a measure of members’ vulnerability to balance of 
payments shocks and therefore of the potential need for Fund resources.  
                                                 
10 International dollars are a hypothetical unit of currency with the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar has  in 
the United States at a given point in time.   14 
Reserves (RES). Official reserves are defined as the annual average of the sum of foreign exchange, 
SDR holdings, reserve position in the Fund, and monetary gold valued at SDR 35 per fine troy 
ounce. They provide an indicator of a member’s financial strength and resilience towards external 
shocks. 
Coefficients  
Coefficients are positive and sum up to one. Thus, they can be interpreted as weights measuring 
the variables’ importance in the formula. The initial debate was heavily influenced by the relative 
position of various countries and country groups in terms of formula variables and their pre 
Singapore voting shares (see table below). 
Formula variables: shares of totals (averages 2003 2005) 
Variables 
(percent of IMF totals) 
Country groups  MER 
GDP 
PPP 
GDP  OPEN  VAR  RES 
VS 
pre  Sing 
Advanced  75.3  56.5  69.2  62.8  37.4  60.67 
Non advanced  24.7  43.5  30.8  37.2  62.6  39.33 
Memo:             
Dynamic  14.9  26.0  16.8  17.2  38.9  12.03 
PRGF  3.2  7.6  3.2  4.2  6.2  8.43 
 EU27  31.0  24.2  43.7  31.2  11.4  32.55 
Note: for each country group the largest weight is reported in bold. 
Not surprisingly, advanced countries were the most vocal supporters of a stronger weight for 
GDP at market exchange rates, since they accounted for over 75 percent of the total in that 
variable;  dynamic  non advanced  countries  supported  a  heavier  weight  for  GDP  evaluated  at 
purchasing power parities, while EU countries instead favored a greater role for openness, given 
their relatively large weight on that variable. Finally, PRGF countries mostly invoked an increase 
in basic votes, consistently with their low shares in all variables. 
By  the  end  of  2007,  consensus  was  reached  on  several  elements  that  have  been  taken  into 
account in the March 2008 Resolution. These elements will be used for the simulations in the 
remainder of this chapter (we refer to these as the baseline formula): 
￿  An overall weight of 50 percent for MER GDP plus PPP GDP;  
￿  A weight on RES of 5 percent; 
￿  The remaining 45 percent would be distributed between OPEN and VAR. Two options 
were on the table at that time: either 30 percent for openness and 15 for variability, or 25 and 
20 percent, respectively. 
GDP Blend 
The IMFC Communiqué of October 2007 noted that a blended measure of GDP, defined as the 
weighted average of MER GDP and PPP GDP, “should play a role”.  
The introduction of a blend for the GDP in the formula is one possibility and the effects of this 
choice are shown in the figure and table below. The figure shows the aggregate CQS of advanced 
and non advanced countries with the blend varying from a fifty fifty scenario to an unblended   15
one.
11  The  lower  the  weight  for  PPP GDP,  the  lower  the  aggregate  CQS  of  non advanced 
countries. In addition, the table displays how the number of under represented countries changes 
according to different blends. Coherently with the following figure, we observe that the number 
of advanced (non advanced) under represented countries increases (decreases) with the weight of 
GDP at market exchange rates. 
 
Blending and under representation 




    50/50  75/25  100/0 
All IMF 
members  185  60  54  53 
Advanced   25  16  16  16 
Non advanced   160  44  38  37 
Memorandum         
Dynamic  12  11  10  10 
PRGF   78  13  9  9 
 
Compression  
By compression we mean the effect on the quota distribution of two parameters: f (the compression 
factor) and F (the rescaling factor). During quota negotiations, its use was proposed and strongly 
supported by European countries, especially the small ones, as a means to adjust for the high 
correlation of size related variables, which tends to favour large economies.
12 
The compression of the quota formula entails the following two step procedure. First, for each 
member, the weighted sum of its shares in the variables’ totals (
i
N N
i i X w X w X w + + + ... 2 2 1 1 ) is raised 
to the power of f (which is positive but lower than one). Second, the calculated quota shares are 
multiplied  by  the  rescaling  factor F to  sum  up  to  100.
13  A  “compressed”  quota  share  is,  in 
general, different from the original one but it is not trivial to say which one is higher. In fact, the 
final effect is the result of two components that might be pushing towards opposite directions. 
On the one hand, f will decrease (increase) the weighted sum depending on whether the latter is 
higher (lower) than one.
14 On the other hand, F will always increase the compressed quota share 
for all members, since it is greater than one.
15 For a single country there may be either an increase 
or a decrease in the calculated quota share, depending on which effect dominates.  
                                                 
11 The other parameters in the formula are taken from our baseline formula. 
12 Although compression was not favourable to large European countries, these latter decided to support it to the 
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F . The rescaling factor  is therefore a function of all other parameters. 
14 According to the baseline formula, there are 166 countries that have a weighted sum of their shares in the 
variables’ totals below 1: these countries will certainly take advantage from higher compression. 
15 Theoretically, if compressed quotas summed up to a number higher than 100, then F would be lower than 1.   16
One advantage of this procedure is that it does not modify countries’ ranking with respect to the 
non compressed case. In the extreme case of f = 1 (no compression), the formula becomes a 
linear weighted sum. In the opposite case of f = 0, each country is assigned the same quota share, 
which is equal to 1/185. 
The effects of compression are illustrated in the figure and table below. The number of under 
represented countries according to the baseline formula is shown for values of f between 1 and 0. 
With no compression (f = 1), there are 42 under represented countries. Their number increases 
monotonically for most values of f and decreases slightly only if f falls below 0.4. In the baseline 
scenario (f = 0.95, vertical line) there are 53 under represented countries. This increase is due to 
the high number of relatively small economies in terms of quotas. In fact, when the degree of 
compression increases (i.e., when f decreases) small countries are more likely to become under 
represented.  To  gauge  the  quantitative  effect  of  compression,  we  can  look  at  the  shift  in 
calculated quota share of relevant country groups with respect to the no compression case. The 
table shows the shift in calculated quota shares from large to small members and from advanced 
to non advanced countries with respect to the not compressed case for different values of f. As 
expected, the shift gets larger when the compression factor f decreases. Moreover, all other things 
being equal, the shift from big countries to small ones is larger than that from advanced to non 
advanced  countries.  This  is  so  because  compression  prominently  favours  small  countries, 
irrespective of whether they are advanced or not. 
 
Compression and shift in quota shares 
f 
From large 
to small countries 
From advanced 
to non advanced 
0.97  1.85  1.24 
0.95  3.11  2.09 
0.90  6.29  4.28 
Note: “Large” countries are those with a quota share above 
3 percent. 
 
Under representation threshold 
A country i will be defined under represented if the following condition holds: 






In other words, the ratio between its calculated and actual quota shares must be greater than a 
certain number. If θ equals 0, this condition says that CQS must be greater than AQS; if it is 
positive, then CQS must surmount AQS by a certain percentage. The parameter θ is referred to 
as under representation threshold. On the contrary, countries that do not match the condition above 
are  defined  over represented.  The  higher  (lower)  the  ratio,  the  larger  the  degree  of  under 
representation (over representation). In general, all under represented countries will be entitled to 
gain quotas, whilst over represented ones will not.   17 
2.2. Eligibility criteria 
The second element is represented by the criteria used to identify countries eligible to receive a 
quota increase. 
An obvious point of departure is to treat all countries that are under represented according to the 
formula as eligible for a quota increase. The number of eligible countries could be enlarged further 
either through additional criteria or “eligibility filters”. The discussion on this issue has been 
fruitful for the identification of countries that would deserve special treatment. In fact, even 
though no filters have been included in the March 2008 Resolution, it uses a selection mechanism 
borrowed from the filter which compares a country’s PPP GDP share of the world total to its 
actual  quota  share.  However,  as  we  will  see,  such  filters  are  not  used  for  selecting  eligible 
countries, but for allocating the total quota increase. 
2.3. Total quota increase and its allocation mechanism 
The third element is represented by the increase in total IMF quotas and how it is allocated 
among eligible countries. Combined with the previous elements (formula and eligibility criteria), it 
identifies the new vector of countries’ quota shares. 
The  percentage  increase  in  total  IMF  quotas  is  calculated  with  respect  to  the  quota  levels 
prevailing before the ad hoc quota increase decided in Singapore
16, and is adjusted for the later 
entry of Montenegro in the Fund’s membership.
17 At that juncture, total quotas amounted to 
about SDR 213,756 (US$ 347,995) million. 
As noted earlier, according to the Articles of Agreements each member can veto a reduction in 
its quota (Art. III Section 2(d)). This poses an important constraint on the extent to which actual 
quota shares can converge to their calculated values. In particular, while the relative weight of a 
non eligible country would decrease with respect to all eligible countries, its weight will remain 
unchanged relative to other non eligible countries. In other words, the prevailing rules of the 
game prevent the full adjustment of actual and calculated quota shares. A numeric example may 
be helpful to clarify this claim. Suppose that there are only four members of the IMF: countries 
A, B, C, and D. The table below shows the starting point for the adjustment procedure. Initial 
quotas are known (in both levels and shares), together with calculated quota shares: 
                                                 
16 This is in the aim of the Singapore Resolution, which considers both the initial ad hoc increase and the second one 
as two parts of a unique package.  
17 Montenegro joined the Fund in January 2007. Its quota was set at SDR 28 (US$ 45) million.   18 
 
  Quotas 
  Initial    Calculated 
Country  (units)  (%)    (%) 
A  $40  40    30 
B  $30  30    40 
C  $20  20    10 
D  $10  10    20 
Tot.  $100  100    100 
In particular, we can observe the following: 
(1) Both B and D are under represented and therefore are eligible to receive a quota increase; the 
overall weight of these countries should be equal to 60, while B should weigh twice as much 
as D; 
(2) A and C are over represented; their total weight should be 40 percent, and C should weigh 
one third of A. 
How can countries’ quota shares be adjusted to their calculated distribution? Because we cannot 
impose any reduction of quotas, the over represented countries (A and C) must be left with their 




  Initial    Calculated    Final 
Country  (units)  (%)    (%)    (units) 
A  $40  40    30    40 
B  $30  30    40     
C  $20  20    10    20 
D  $10  10    20     
Tot.  $100  100    100     
If it were possible to increase the total amount of quotas as much as we like, this could be 
computed by imposing the total weight of A and C to equal 40 percent, that is: 
150 $ 40 . 0






Thus, we have to distribute $90 ($150   $40   20$) to B and D. Since B should weigh twice as 
much as D, we can assign a new quota level of $60 to B and $30 to D. Our table eventually 
becomes:   19 
 
  Quotas 
  Initial     Calculated    Final 
Country  (units)  (%)    (%)    (units)  (%) 
A  $40  40    30    $40  26.7 
B  $30  30    40    $60  40 
C  $20  20    10    $20  13.3 
D  $10  10    20    $30  20 
Tot.  $100  100    100    $150  100 
In  the  final  situation,  the  actual  quota  shares  of  under represented  countries  are  perfectly  
matched with their calculated values. On the contrary, the shares of over represented countries 
are matched only in aggregate, not for individual countries: the condition that D should weigh 
one third of A is not met because of the constraint imposed by the Articles of Agreements. 
If total IMF quotas were to increase to a level below $150, the adjustment would have been even 
more  incomplete,  in  fact  under represented  countries  would  have  only  moved  towards  (but 
would have not reached) their calculated quota shares. 
To conclude: given the constraint posed by the Article of Agreements, the weight of non eligible 
countries  as  a  group  can  be  reduced  vis à vis  that  of  eligible  countries,  but  the  relative 
distribution within non eligible countries cannot be modified. This raises a problem of equity, 
because countries can be over represented at different degrees.  
Allocation mechanisms 
Given a certain amount of new quotas to be distributed among eligible countries, rules governing 
the allocation of the increase are needed. These rules are referred to as allocation mechanisms and 
can be divided into two broad categories: ad hoc rules and rules of general application. Ad hoc rules 
are targeted to selectively identify specific eligible countries. For example, it could be prescribed 
that over represented countries, which have qualified for a filter, receive a given increase in their 
voting share. Alternatively an ad hoc rule could bound the amount of quotas distributed to some 
groups  and  increase  this  amount  for  others.  General  rules  apply  to  all  under represented 
countries and include: 
Proportional distribution. Each country is assigned a share corresponding to its relative weight in the 
group of under represented countries. This criterion is intuitive but has an important drawback: 
large but only slightly under represented countries would get the largest part of the total increase 
in quotas.  
Equiproportional gap closure. The under representation gap is defined as the (positive) difference 
between CQS and AQS; the gap closure (α) is the share of the gap filled after the adjustment, that 





= a  
where FQS is the final quota share after the adjustment. 
According to the equiproportional gap reduction criterion, all under represented countries would 
get the same gap closure. This rule is fair as it treats each member equally, but involves some 
technical difficulties for the computation of the equilibrium value of α, which depends on the 
overall quota increase (see the appendix for more details). The relation between the latter and α is 
depicted in Figure 3: the greater the increase in total IMF quotas R, the better the fit between 
new quota shares and calculated ones.  
 
  Figure 3   
Overall increase and gap closure 
Overall increase  
(%) 
Gap closure  
(decimal) 
10  0.29 
20  0.54 
30  0.75 
40  0.93 
43  0.97 
44  0.98 
Note: used formula: 
( )
95 . 0 05 . 0 15 . 0 3 . 0 125 . 0 375 . 0 RE VAR OPEN PPPGDP MERGDP + + + +  A full gap 
closure would require a total increase of about 44 percent. 
Foregoing 
By foregoing we mean the amount of additional quota that an eligible country is willing not to 
subscribe. In particular, this possibility was explicitly contemplated by the United States, and    21 
other G7 under represented countries announced their availability to follow the United States’ 
example. There are two main issues at stake here:  
1.  Amount of foregoing. In principle, eligible countries could opt to give up the whole amount of 
their additional quotas. If they did so, and disregarding any changes in basic votes, their 
voting share would surely diminish because of the increase in total IMF quotas. For this 
reason, the United States bounded their potential foregoing to preserve their voting share at a 
predetermined  level  (either  the  pre Singapore  level,  17.03  percent,  or  the  post Singapore 
level, 16.73 percent). 
2.  Allocation mechanisms. When an eligible country gives up part of its quota increase, this benefits 
all the remaining under represented countries. The higher the foregoing, the greater the gap 
closure for the latter. In principle, the foregoing of some eligible countries could also be 
targeted to a specific subset of under represented countries. In this case, as is clear, the latter 
countries would close their gap even further. Yet, this option was never taken into account in 
the quota negotiations. 
All the elements discussed so far are sufficient to determine the new distribution of IMF’s quota 
shares. The voting share of each member can be obtained by adding basic votes. 
2.4. Basic votes 
The fourth and final element is the number of basic votes, which are by definition equal for 
each member country. The new voting shares can now be calculated. 
According to the Articles of Agreements, each Fund’s member is accorded 250 basic votes (BV), 
irrespective of its quota. In 1945 BV represented 11.3 percent of total votes, but their relative 
importance has steadily declined over the years (see table). Today, they represent a mere 2.1 
percent. This is due to different factors. On the one hand, the absolute number of basic votes per 
member has remained unchanged since the IMF’s foundation, and their total number has grown 
only occasionally, when new countries joined the Fund. On the other, total IMF quotas have 
been repeatedly increased over time – and so have the quota related votes. In order to rebuild the 
1945 share, each member should be assigned  1,328 BV today.   22 
Relative importance of basic votes, 1945 2007 (IMF, 2005) 
      Basic votes 
Year  Members  All votes  Total number  % of total 
1945  45  99,390  11,250  11.3 
1958  68  108,930  17,000  15.6 
1965  101  179,928  25,250  14.0 
1970  115  236,835  28,750  12.1 
1976  132  319,719  33,000  10.3 
1978  140  432,415  35,000  8.1 
1983  145  646,415  36,250  5.6 
1990  152  1,387,910  38,000  2.7 
1998  183  2,166,040  45,750  2.1 
2007  185  2,176,037  46,250  2.1 
The decline of basic votes has been perceived by some countries (especially small developing 
ones) as a loss of voice within the IMF. This loss would be unavoidably exacerbated by a large ad 
hoc  increase  in  IMF  quotas  aimed  at  increasing  the  weight  of  fast growing  emerging  market 
countries, since low income members are typically over represented on the basis of the new 
formula, and are therefore not eligible to any quota increase. To tackle this issue, the Singapore 
Resolution and the last IMFC Communiqué envisaged a clear mandate for at least a doubling of BV 
and for enhancing the voice and representation of developing countries as a group. From a legal 
point of view, a change in the number of basic votes requires an amendment to the Articles of 
Agreement, which must be accepted by three fifths of the members having 85 percent of the 
total voting power. 
Basic votes and quotas together determine the voting power (VP), i.e. the number of votes of each 
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Not all members gain more VS from an increase of BV. In particular, only members whose quota 
is below the average level will benefit from this increase
 18, in other words: 
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An  increase  in  BV  enhances  the  voice  of  all  countries  which  are  small  in  terms  of  quotas 
regardless of their relative income. Therefore, large emerging market countries, such as China, 
will not benefit from increases in BV, while small advanced economies (e.g. San Marino and 
Luxembourg) will.  
Quota size and economic development 
  Advanced  Non advanced  Total 
Very small  10  138  148 
Others  17  20  37 
Tot.  27  158  185 
Note: Very small countries have a quota below the average. 
A more general picture is provided in Figure 4, which shows the effect on the total voting power 
of a doubling or a tripling of BV. 
 
  Figure 4   
A doubling of BV would produce a more than 50 percent increase of VP for 26 IMF members, 
whose quota is less than SDR 25 million. Similarly, the 48 IMF members with quotas less than 
SDR 75 million will have their quota increased by more than 50 per cent in the case of BV set at 
750. 
Not surprisingly, all these countries are very small: in the former case, they have an average quota 
of SDR 10 million and a quota share of 0.005 percent; in the latter case, they have an average 
quota of SDR 31.5 million and a quota share of 0.014 percent.   24 
3. THE 2008 RESOLUTION 
A resolution on quotas and voice was finally approved by the Board of Governors on April 28
th 
2008  (hereafter  Resolution).
19  In  this  chapter  we  describe  the  Resolution  in  the  light  of  the 
framework previously proposed and provide an assessment of the political value of its content.  
In order to accommodate the different requests of the membership regarding the GDP blend, 
the  use  of  a  compression  factor,  and  the  weights  of  the  variables,  the  Resolution  uses  the 
following formula to calculate quota shares: 
95 . 0 ) 05 . 0 15 . 0 3 . 0 2 . 0 3 . 0 ( 055 . 1
i i i i i i RES VAR OPEN PPPGDP GDP q ´ + ´ + ´ + ´ + ´ ´ =  
Recognizing that the inclusion of PPP GDP and compression has been one of the most difficult 
aspects of the deliberations, the Board of Governors decided to keep these elements for a limited 
period of time of 20 years (sunset clauses). Later than that these elements might no longer be 
used for the quota realignments.  
Regarding other elements of the package, the Resolution stipulates a tripling of basic votes from 
250  to  750  and  a  total  quota  increase  of  11.5  percent  with  respect  to  pre Singapore.
20  The 
allocation  of  the  increase  to  under represented  countries  is  based  primarily  on  the 
equiproportional gap closure allocation criterion, which yields to a gap reduction between actual 
and calculated quota shares of 29.8 percent. This approach is complemented with three ad hoc 
criteria, namely: (a) foregoing of quota increases by some under represented advanced members; 
(b)  a  minimum  quota  increase  for  China,  Korea,  Mexico,  and  Turkey  (the  “Singapore  4” 
countries); (c) a “booster” for the quotas of dynamic emerging market economies.  
-  Foregoing.  The  four  under represented  G7  countries  (US,  Japan,  Germany  and  Italy) 
forego part of the quota increase they are entitled to, but following different criteria. 
Specifically, the US foregoes any quota increase greater than that needed to preserve its 
post Singapore voting share (16.73 percent). This implies a gap closure equal to 18.3 
percent. The remaining under represented G7 countries close the gap between actual and 
calculated  quota  shares  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  US.  In  addition,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg, two very under represented advanced members, have agreed to forego part 
of  the  increases  they  would  otherwise  be  eligible  for  (in  particular,  those  beyond  a 
nominal quota increase of 50 percent). This implies a gap closure of, respectively, 17.3 
and 9.1 percent.
21  
-  Singapore 4 countries. China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey increase their quotas by at least 15 
percent with respect to the post Singapore level. Korea and Mexico benefit from this 
clause and close their gap by 41 and 43 percent, respectively.  
-  Booster.  Under represented  members,  whose  share  of  global  PPP GDP  exceeds  their 
current quota share by more than 75 percent are guaranteed a minimum quota increase of 
                                                 
19 The Resolution was approved by the Board of Governors with 92.93 percent of total votes. Russia and Saudi 
Arabia abstained, whilst Argentina voted against the Resolution. 
20 It corresponds to a 9.6 percent increase with respect to post Singapore. 
21  Without  foregoing,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg  would  have  received  a  quota  increase  of  73  and  128  percent, 
respectively.   25 
40 percent. Only Brazil, India and Vietnam benefit from the booster, but are affected 
differently: for example, while Vietnam faces a gap closure of only 51 percent, India and 
Brazil close their gap by 980 and 105 percent respectively (with the new quota their 
representation status turns from under  to over represented).  
In  order  to  enlarge  the  consensus,  two  amendments  to  the  Articles  of  Agreement  were 
contemplated:  (i)  the  Executive  Directors  of  large  constituencies  (African)  will  appoint  one 
additional Alternate; (ii) the automatic adjustment of basic votes, whose aggregate weight on the 
total voting power will be maintained at 5.502 percent. The introduction of the latter amendment 
implies that the number of basic votes allocated to each member will no longer be fixed but will 
change endogenously and automatically according to changes in the number of Fund’s members 
as well as in their quotas.
22 Specifically: 
(a) in case of changes in the quotas of members, any increase will trigger a rise in both the 
aggregate  number  of  basic  votes  and  the  number  of  basic  votes  granted  to  each  member. 
Symmetrically, any decrease in a member’s quota will result in a decrease in the number of basic 
votes, at both the aggregate and individual country level. 
(b) in case of changes in the number of members, both the aggregate and individual number of 
basic votes will change with admission or withdrawal of a member. In particular, the net effect 
will depend on whether the quota of the member that is being admitted or withdrawn is higher or 
lower then the average quota. 
Finally, the Resolution commits the  Executive Board to recommend further realignments of 
quota  shares  in  the  context  of  future  General  Quota  Reviews,  to  ensure  that  quota  shares 
continue to reflect members’ relative position in the world economy.  
The quota and voting shares for country groups and relevant countries, as they result from the 
2008 Reform, are reported in the following table.  
                                                 
22 Analytically, after the 2008 Resolution the basic votes of an individual country will be a linear function of the total 
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Quota and voting shares for country groups and relevant countries 
     QUOTA SHARES (pp)    VOTING SHARES (pp) 
    
  Pre 
Singapore 
 Post 
Singapore  Calculated  
2008 
Reform   






Advanced    61.5  60.4  63.7  60.4    60.5  59.5  57.8 
Non advanced    38.5  39.6  36.3  39.6    39.5  40.5  42.2 
Memo:                   
Dynamic    12.2  13.7  19.5  15.3    12.0  13.5  14.8 
PRGF    7.7  7.6  4.9  7.7    8.4  8.3  9.6 
EU27    32.9  32.4  32.9  31.9    32.5  32.0  30.9 
                   
ADVANCED                   
(a) under represented                   
United States    17.38  17.08  18.99  17.67    17.02  16.73  16.73 
Japan    6.23  6.12  8.03  6.56    6.11  6  6.23 
Germany    6.09  5.98  6.23  6.11    5.97  5.87  5.8 
Italy    3.3  3.24  3.34  3.31    3.24  3.19  3.16 
Spain    1.43  1.4  2.3  1.69    1.41  1.38  1.62 
Ireland    0.39  0.39  1.17  0.53    0.4  0.39  0.53 
Luxembourg    0.13  0.13  0.62  0.18    0.14  0.14  0.2 
                   
(b) over represented                   
France    5.02  4.94  4.02  4.51    4.93  4.84  4.29 
United Kingdom    5.02  4.94  4.43  4.51    4.93  4.84  4.29 
Canada    2.98  2.93  2.57  2.67    2.93  2.88  2.56 
Netherlands    2.41  2.37  1.93  2.17    2.38  2.33  2.08 
Belgium    2.15  2.12  1.5  1.93    2.12  2.08  1.86 
Sweden    1.12  1.1  0.99  1.01    1.11  1.09  0.98 
Finland    0.59  0.58  0.54  0.53    0.59  0.58  0.53 
                   
NON ADVANCED                   
(a) under represented                   
China    2.98  3.72  6.39  3.99    2.93  3.65  3.8 
India    1.95  1.91  2  2.44    1.92  1.88  2.34 
Mexico    1.21  1.45  1.97  1.52    1.2  1.43  1.47 
Brazil    1.42  1.4  1.72  1.78    1.4  1.38  1.72 
Korea    0.76  1.35  2.24  1.41    0.76  1.33  1.36 
Turkey    0.45  0.55  0.99  0.61    0.45  0.55  0.61 
Vietnam    0.15  0.15  0.23  0.19    0.16  0.16  0.21 
                   
(b) over represented                   
Saudi Arabia    3.27  3.21  0.83  2.93    3.21  3.16  2.8 
Russia    2.78  2.73  2.05  2.49    2.73  2.69  2.39 
Australia    1.51  1.49  1.32  1.36    1.49  1.47  1.31 
Argentina    0.99  0.97  0.58  0.89    0.98  0.96  0.87 
Indonesia    0.97  0.96  0.9  0.87    0.96  0.95  0.85 
South Africa    0.87  0.86  0.59  0.78    0.87  0.85  0.77 
Iran, I.R. of     0.70  0.69  0.59  0.63     0.70  0.69  0.62 
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3.1. An evaluation 
The  2008  Reform  reflects  a  compromise  between  conflicting  requests  advanced  by  the 
membership during the negotiations. On the one hand, the inclusion of PPP GDP in the formula 
is a concession made in favor of emerging market and developing countries; its coefficient in the 
formula has been chosen to include India in the group of under represented countries. On the 
other hand, the use of a compression factor and the large weight attributed to the openness 
variable (30 percent) represent a concession made to European countries. With respect to a linear 
formula, compression penalizes the largest IMF members (US, Japan, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, China, Italy and Saudi Arabia), Canada is indifferent, and all the remaining 175 IMF 
members gain.  
The Resolution implies 135 countries will receive an increase in voting share. The aggregate gain 
for  these  countries  amounts  to 5.4  percentage  points,  while  the  shift  of  voting  shares  from 
advanced to non advanced countries is 2.7 percentage points. Although not unprecedented, the 
voting share gain for non advanced economies is fairly large by historical standards. A larger gain  
than 2.7 points was observed only twice, in 1963 and 1978. In the first instance, 20 new members 
(all non advanced) joined the Fund; in the second case, there was a large quota increase for oil 
exporting countries. 
A  group  of  influential  Washington based  academics
23  has  judged  the  reform  package  as  a 
“modest improvement in governance” of the IMF; according to them the formula is the weakest 
element of the package as it generates limited changes in voting shares. Overall, the reform is 
considered to “fall far short in addressing the challenges facing the IMF in its evolution toward a 
truly global institution with more balanced and inclusive representation and voting power”
24. This 
view has also been shared by G 24 countries: in their 2008 Spring Meetings Communiqué, the 
increase in voting and quota shares of developing countries was considered still insufficient to 
reach the goals of the reform. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the reform we tried to disentangle the relative importance of its 
main elements, namely: i) the quota formula, ii) the tripling of basic votes and iii) the additional ad 
hoc  elements  (booster,  Singapore 4  and  foregoing).  The  first  two  elements  represent  the 
“structural”  components  of  the  reform,  which  are  bound  to  persist  in  the  future  quota 
negotiations  while  the  remaining  elements  were  meant  to  apply  only  to  this  round  of 
negotiations. 
We simulated three different scenarios always using the new formula (see above), the same total 
quota increase (11.5 percent) and the equiproportional gap closure as distribution criterion. In 
scenario  (1)  basic  votes  are  kept  constant  at  their  traditional  level  (250)  and  no  additional 
elements are included; in scenario (2) basic votes are tripled, all else being equal to (1); the third is 
the 2008 Reform scenario. In the table below, we report the shift in voting share with respect to 
pre Singapore for the three simulations. 
                                                 
23  The  group  included  Nancy  Birdsall,  president  of  the  Center  for  Global  Development,  Ralph  Bryant,  Colin 
Bradford,  Homi  Karas,  Johannes Linn  of the Brookings Institution, Ted Truman  and  John Williamson  of  the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Jo Marie Griesgraber of the New Rules for Global Finance 
Coalition. 
24  “Letter  to  the  Executive  Directors  of  the  IMF  and  their  Governments,  26  March  2008”,  available  at 
www.cgdev.org.    28 
 
 
Shift in voting shares  
(with respect to pre Singapore) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Advanced   0.2   1.9   2.7 
memo:       
Dynamic  2.3  2.0  2.8 
PRGF   0.6  0.7  1.1 
EU27   0.7   1.3   1.6 
(1): new formula, increase in total IMF quotas= 11.5%, equiproportional 
gap closure and BV=250 
(2): new formula, increase in total IMF quotas = 11.5%, equiproportional 
gap closure and BV=750 
(3): IMF 2008 Reform 
We can observe the following: 
1)  The new formula alone is able to deliver a substantial increase in the voting share of 
dynamic  countries,  while  it  leaves  almost  unchanged  advanced  countries’  share  and 
penalizes PRGF countries. 
2)  If  we  introduce  a  combination  of  the  new  formula  plus  the  tripling  basic  votes,  it 
increases the shift of PRGF whilst enlargingthe loss of advanced countries.  
3)  The ad hoc elements amplify further the loss of advanced and, consequently, the gain of 
dynamic and PRGF countries. 
Based on this, the overall shift of 2.7 percentage points can be explained mostly (over 60%) by 
the basic votes increase, whilst ad hoc elements represent less than one third of it. Therefore, the 
doubts  raised  on  the  likely  capacity  of  the  new  formula  to  respond  to  future  claims  from 
developing and emerging countries remain. 
Prospectively, in the context of future general quota reviews, ad hoc elements will not hold and 
basic votes will be adjusted endogenously.
25 The formula would then be the only means to deliver 
further realignments in quota and voting shares. Whether it would be capable of doing so is still 
questionable. For example, assume that, with the voting share distribution stemming from the 
2008 Reform in place, the ongoing fourteenth General Quota Review will end before data and 
variables will have been updated: this translates into a scenario featuring the new formula and the 
basic votes adjustment mechanism. In this context, we simulated a 10 percent quota increase 
allocated through the equiproportional distribution criterion. With respect to the “post Reform” 
situation, the shift in voting share from  advanced countries to non advanced ones would then be 
of 0.4 percentage points, whilst dynamic countries would gain 1.8 and PRGF would lose 0.6. 
These results, which do not account for the evolution of the global economy, point to the likely 
need for future revisions of the formula and its variables. In particular, openness and variability 
leave more scope for further work on their definitions.
26   
                                                 
25 For example, an overall quota increase of 10 percent (20 percent) will result in 825 (900) basic votes granted to 
each member. 
26 Regarding openness, the main issues are the inclusion of financial openness, the exclusion of intra currency union 
trade flows and the development of an alternative openness measure based on value added. Regarding variability, the 
staff has examined a range of options for amending or redefining its measure (see IMF 2007b for details).   29 
In line with this view, the 2008 Spring Meetings IMFC Communiqué stipulates: “[further quota 
shares] realignments are expected to result in increases in the quota shares of dynamic economies, 
and hence in the share of emerging market and developing countries as a whole. The Committee 
looks forward to further work by the Executive board on elements of the new quota formula that 
can be improved before the formula is used again”.    30 
CONCLUSIONS 
The current voting share distribution at the IMF neither reflects the weights and roles of member 
countries in the world economy nor does it protect the voice of low income countries. In order 
to address these issues, a comprehensive quota and voice reform package was approved by the 
Board of Governors. The reform aims at enhancing the Fund’s credibility among its members by 
introducing a new quota system and should strengthen the role of new global players along with 
the  representation of low income countries. 
Any  change  in  the  quota  distribution  is  a  zero  sum  game:  an  increase  for  some  countries 
necessarily results in a decrease for others. Therefore, the debate on the key features of the new 
quota system has been characterized by the existence of competing political requests. Moreover, 
the construction of a politically feasible system has involved several technical difficulties. This 
paper  has  provided  a  historical  perspective  of  previous  quota  increases  along  with  the  main 
shortcomings of the current system. It has also given motivations for deep changes in the existing 
quota and voice distribution and described the evolution of the debate. Moreover, it has explored 
each  element  together  with  the  political  issues  involved  and  the  interaction  between  them. 
Finally, the 2008 Reform package has been described and evaluated with respect to the analytical 
framework developed. 
The Reform is a first and substantial step towards a better governance structure for the IMF 
However, it represents a compromise and, as such, shows some shortcomings that need to be 
addressed by future negotiations.     31 
APPENDIX 
A. Key elements of the reform agenda approved in Singapore 
·  Initial ad hoc quota increases of four of the most clearly under represented members—China, 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey; 
·  Agreement, by the time of the 2008 Spring Meetings, on a new quota formula that can provide 
a simpler and more transparent means of capturing members’ relative positions in the world 
economy; 
·  A second round of ad hoc quota increases, based on the new formula, with a view to achieving a 
significant  further  alignment  of  members’  quotas  with  their  relative  positions  in  the  world 
economy; 
·  Agreement that general reviews of quotas conducted after the completion of these reforms also 
consider distributing any increases in quotas with a view to achieving a better alignment of 
members’ quotas with their relative positions in the world economy, while ensuring that the 
Fund has adequate liquidity to achieve its purposes; 
·  An amendment to the Articles of Agreement that would provide for at least a doubling of basic 
votes that at a minimum protect the pre Singapore voting share of low income countries as a 
group, while also ensuring that the share of basic votes to total votes is preserved in the future; 
·  An increase in staffing resources available to Executive Directors representing a large number 
of members, whose workload is particularly heavy; and 
·  Consideration of the merits of an amendment to the Articles to enable Executive Directors 
representing  a  large  number  of  members  to  appoint  more  than  one  Alternate  Executive 
Director. 
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B. The system of formulas before the 2008 Reform 
The original Bretton Woods (BW) formula was a single equation intended to provide a comprehensive 
measure of the relative size of a country’s economy that took into account important differences in the 
economic structures of countries. The formula contained the following variables in levels (millions of 
SDR): (i) national income; (ii) reserves; (iii) merchandise imports; (iv) variability of exports. Variables 
under (i) and (ii) were thought of as proxies for a measure of a country’s ability to contribute, whilst the 
remaining ones were envisaged as indicators for a member’s possible need of IMF resources. 
In order to bridge some of the gap between actual and calculated quotas and to increase the quotas of 
smaller  primary  commodity  producing  countries,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Sixties,  the  original  BW 
formula was deeply revised and two new variables, namely, current payments and current receipts, 
replaced imports and exports. In addition, four derivative formulas were developed with higher weights 
on trade and variability, in order to cope with the issues of small open economies.   
In 1983 the quota formulas were subject to a last revision, aimed at updating the definition of variables 
and reducing variability weight in the derived formulas. There have been no changes in the formulas 
since  1983,  although  on  several  occasions  the  Executive  Board  considered  proposals  for  changes, 
mostly in the variables to be included.  
At the current juncture, the formulas are as follows:  
Bretton Woods: Q1 = (0.0100GDP  + 0.0250RES  + 0.0500P    + 0.2276 VAR)(1+C/GDP) 
Scheme III:   Q2 = (0.0065GDP  + 0.0205RES  + 0.0780P   + 0.4052VAR)(1+C/GDP) 
Scheme IV:   Q3 = (0.0045GDP  + 0.0390RES  + 0.0700P    + 0.7700VAR)(1+C/GDP) 
Scheme M4:   Q4 =  0.0050GDP  + 0.0423RES  + 0.0440(P+C) + 0.8352VAR 
Scheme M7:   Q5 =  0.0045GDP  + 0.0528RES  + 0.0390(P+C) + 1.0432VAR 
Where all variables are expressed in levels and: 
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5 = calculated quotas for each formula; 
GDP = gross domestic product measured at current market prices for a recent year; 
RES = twelve month average of gold, foreign exchange reserves, SDR holdings and reserve positions 
in the IMF, for a recent year; 
P = annual average of current payments (goods, services, income, and private transfers) for a recent 
five year period; 
C = annual average of current receipts (goods, services, income, and private transfers) for a recent five 
year period;  
VAR = variability of current receipts, defined as one standard deviation from the centred five year 
moving average, for a recent 13 year period. 
For each of the four non Bretton Woods formulas, quota calculations are multiplied by an adjustment 
factor so that the sum of the calculations across members equals that derived from the Bretton Woods 
formula. 
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C. Equilibrium α 
By manipulating the definition of α given in the text, it yields to 
( ) I     ,
i Î " - + = i AQS CQS AQS FQS
i i i a .  (*) 













i is the actual quota level for the i th country, NQ
i is the quota increase for the i th country, 
Q is the total actual quota level and R is the increase in the Fund’s quota. 
Thus, by plugging into equation (*) the above definition, one can solve for 
i NQ :  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) I     , AQL - 1
i Î " - + ´ + ´ = i AQS CQS AQS R Q NQ
i i i i a   (**) 
 






i R NQ   (***) 
 
Equations (**) and (***) form a linear system of I+1 equations in I+1 unknowns that can be solved 
either numerically or analytically.  Notice that if we solve the simple example used in the text, we will 
obtain  30 =
B NQ , 20 =
D NQ  and, notably,  1 = a . If, in the same example, we had set  30 = R , we 
would have obtained  20 =
B NQ , 10 =
D NQ , and  3
1 = a . Thus, final quota shares would have been 
% 79 , 30 =
A FQS ,  % 46 , 38 =
B FQS , % 38 , 15 = =
D C FQS FQS . 
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